Obama’s Wars Read online

  ALSO BY BOB WOODWARD

  The War Within: A Secret White House History, 2006–2008

  State of Denial

  The Secret Man

  (with a Reporter’s Assessment by Carl Bernstein)

  Plan of Attack

  Bush at War

  Maestro: Greenspan’s Fed and the American Boom

  Shadow: Five Presidents and the Legacy of Watergate

  The Choice

  The Agenda: Inside the Clinton White House

  The Commanders

  Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA, 1981–1987

  Wired: The Short Life and Fast Times of John Belushi

  The Brethren

  (with Scott Armstrong)

  The Final Days

  (with Carl Bernstein)

  All the President’s Men

  (with Carl Bernstein)

  Simon & Schuster

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  Copyright © 2010 by Bob Woodward

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  Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available.

  ISBN 978-1-4391-7249-0

  ISBN 978-1-4391-7251-3 (ebook)

  To those who serve

  CONTENTS

  Author’s Personal Note

  Note to Readers

  Cast of Characters

  Chapters 1–33

  Glossary

  President Obama’s Final Orders, November 29, 2009

  Chapter Notes

  Acknowledgments

  Photography Credits

  Index

  AUTHOR’S PERSONAL NOTE

  I had two of the most exceptional people assist me full-time on the reporting, writing, editing and thinking about this book:

  Josh Boak, a 2001 cum laude graduate of Princeton and later of the Columbia University master’s program in journalism, came to work after reporting at The Blade in Toledo, Ohio, and the Chicago Tribune. He may be the most energetic, resourceful, fair-minded and good-natured young man I have had the good fortune to work with. On his résumé he described himself as “skilled in shoe-leather reporting and phone-jockeying.” True, but he is much more. Josh immersed himself in all the details and nuances of the Afghanistan War, the Obama administration and Washington politics. He became a part of my brain—the better part. At times, I came to think he knows everything. What is not in his head, he can and does find almost instantly. He is a skilled writer and a superb investigator. I leaned on Josh, pushed him as he pushed me. We never had even a half-serious disagreement. The result has been permanent trust and permanent friendship. There would be no book without him—not even close.

  Evelyn M. Duffy, who worked with me on The War Within: A Secret White House History, 2006–2008, continued on this project. Thank God. At age 25 now, she is a wizard at everything—thinking, prodding and again transcribing hundreds of hours of recorded interviews with people ranging from President Obama to generals and intelligence officials. A 2007 English and creative writing graduate of George Washington University, she is a truly gifted writer. She has written and produced a one-act play, Nighthawks, based on Edward Hopper’s famous late-night diner painting. In her spare time, Evelyn has written a stunning young adult novel, which I’m sure will be published soon once I give her time to meet with agents and editors. She is both intellectual and practical—a rare combination. I stand in awe of her maturity, drive and independent spirit. A friend for life, Evelyn left her stamp of integrity on every idea, scene and page in this book.

  NOTE TO READERS

  A word of explanation about how the information in this book was obtained, evaluated and used. This book is designed to present, as best my reporting could determine, what really happened.

  The core of this book comes from the written record—National Security Council meeting notes, personal notes, memos, chronologies, letters, PowerPoint slides, e-mails, reports, government cables, calendars, transcripts, diaries and maps.

  Information in the book was supplied by more than 100 people involved in the Afghanistan War and national security during the first 18 months of President Barack Obama’s administration. Interviews were conducted on “background,” meaning the information could be used but the sources would not be identified by name. Many sources were interviewed five or more times. Most allowed me to record the interviews, which were then transcribed. For several sources, the combined interview transcripts run more than 300 pages. I have attempted to preserve the language of the main characters and sources as much as possible, using their words even when they are not directly quoted, reflecting the flavor of their speech and attitudes.

  Many key White House aides were interviewed in-depth. They shared meeting notes, important documents, recollections of what happened before, during and after meetings, and assisted extensively with their interpretations.

  Senior and well-placed military, intelligence and diplomatic officials also provided detailed recollections, read from notes or assisted with documents.

  Since the reporting was done over 18 months, many interviews were conducted within days or even hours after critical discussions. This often provided a fresher and less-calculated account.

  Dialogue comes mostly from the written record, but also from participants, usually more than one. Any attribution of thoughts, conclusions or feelings to a person was obtained directly from that person, from notes or from a colleague whom the person told.

  Occasionally, a source said mid-conversation that something was “off-the-record,” meaning it could not be used unless the information was obtained elsewhere. In many cases, I was able to get the information elsewhere so that it could be included in this book. Some people think they can lock up and prevent publication of information by declaring it “off-the-record” or that they don’t want to see it in the book. But inside any White House, nearly everyone’s business and attitudes become known to others. And in the course of multiple, extensive interviews with firsthand sources about key decision points in the war, the role of the players became clear.

  Given the diversity of sources, stakes and the lives involved, there is no way I could write a sterilized or laundered version of this story.

  I interviewed President Obama on-the-record in the Oval Office for one hour and 15 minutes on Saturday, July 10, 2010.

  Bob Woodward

  July 25, 2010

  Washington, D.C.

  CAST OF CHARACTERS

  THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

  Barack H. Obama

  VICE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

  Joseph R. Biden

  THE WHITE HOUSE

  White House Chief of Staff

  Rahm I. Emanuel

  Senior Adviser to the President

  David M. Axelrod

  White House Press Secretary

  Robert L. Gibbs

  NATIONAL
SECURITY COUNCIL

  National Security Adviser

  General James L. Jones, U.S. Marine Corps, retired

  Deputy National Security Adviser

  Thomas E. Donilon

  Senior Adviser and Coordinator for Afghanistan-Pakistan

  Lieutenant General Douglas E. Lute, U.S. Army, retired

  National Security Council Chief of Staff

  Mark W. Lippert

  January 20, 2009–October 2, 2009

  Denis McDonough

  October 2, 2009–

  Assistant to the President for Counterterrorism and Homeland Security

  John O. Brennan

  National Security Adviser to the Vice President

  Antony J. Blinken

  Deputy National Security Adviser for Strategic Communications

  Benjamin Rhodes

  Chairman, Interagency Policy Review of Afghanistan-Pakistan

  Bruce O. Riedel

  February 10–March 27, 2009

  DEPARTMENT OF STATE

  Secretary of State

  Hillary Rodham Clinton

  Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan

  Richard C. Holbrooke

  United States Ambassador to Afghanistan

  Lieutenant General Karl W. Eikenberry, U.S. Army, retired

  United States Ambassador to Pakistan

  Anne W. Patterson

  DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

  Secretary of Defense

  Robert M. Gates

  Undersecretary for Policy

  Michèle A. Flournoy

  Pentagon Press Secretary

  Geoffrey S. Morrell

  THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

  Director of National Intelligence

  Vice Admiral Michael McConnell, U.S. Navy, retired

  February 13, 2007–January 29, 2009

  Admiral Dennis C. Blair, U.S. Navy, retired

  January 29, 2009–May 28, 2010

  Director of the Central Intelligence Agency

  General Michael V. Hayden, U.S. Air Force, retired

  May 30, 2006–February 19, 2009

  Leon Panetta

  February 19, 2009–

  Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency

  Stephen R. Kappes

  July 25, 2006–April 14, 2010

  Michael J. Morell

  May 6, 2010–(previously CIA Director for Intelligence, 2006–2010)

  UNITED STATES MILITARY

  Commander, United States Central Command

  General David H. Petraeus, U.S. Army

  October 31, 2008–June 30, 2010

  Commander, U.S. and NATO forces, Afghanistan

  General David D. McKiernan, U.S. Army

  June 3, 2008–June 15, 2009

  General Stanley A. McChrystal, U.S. Army

  June 15, 2009–June 23, 2010

  General David H. Petraeus, U.S. Army

  July 4, 2010–

  Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

  Admiral Michael G. Mullen, U.S. Navy

  Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

  General James E. “Hoss” Cartwright, U.S. Marine Corps

  Director of the Afghanistan-Pakistan Center of Excellence, Central Command

  Colonel Derek Harvey, U.S. Army, retired

  Spokesman for General Petraeus

  Colonel Erik Gunhus, U.S. Army

  AFGHANISTAN

  President of Afghanistan

  Hamid Karzai

  Leader, Provincial Council of Kandahar; President Karzai’s half-brother

  Ahmed Wali Karzai

  PAKISTAN

  President of Pakistan

  Asif Ali Zardari

  Chief of Staff of the Army of Pakistan

  General Ashfaq Kayani

  Pakistani Ambassador to the United States

  Husain Haqqani

  1

  On Thursday, November 6, 2008, two days after he was elected president of the United States, Senator Barack Obama arranged to meet in Chicago with Mike McConnell, the director of national intelligence (DNI).

  McConnell, 65, a retired Navy vice admiral with stooped shoulders, wisps of light brown hair and an impish smile, had come to present details of the most highly classified intelligence operations and capabilities of the vast American espionage establishment he oversaw as DNI. In just 75 days, the formidable powers of the state would reside with the 47-year-old Obama. He would soon be, as the intelligence world often called the president, “The First Customer.”

  McConnell arrived early at the Kluczynski Federal Building, an austere Chicago skyscraper, with Michael J. Morell, who had been President George W. Bush’s presidential briefer on 9/11 and now headed the Central Intelligence Agency’s analysis division.

  Two members of Senator Obama’s transition team from the last Democratic administration greeted them: John Podesta, Bill Clinton’s chief of staff for the final two years of his presidency, and James Steinberg, a former deputy national security adviser in the Clinton White House.

  “We’re going to go in with the president-elect and hear what you guys have got to say,” Podesta said.

  McConnell paused awkwardly. He had received instructions from President Bush. “As president,” Bush had told McConnell, “this is my decision. I forbid any information about our success and how this works” except to the president-elect. McConnell knew Bush had never been comfortable using the terminology “sources and methods.” But what the president meant was that nothing should be disclosed that might identify human spies and new techniques developed to infiltrate and attack al Qaeda, fight the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and defend the nation.

  “John, sorry,” McConnell said. “I’d love to be able to accommodate, but I didn’t make these rules.” He related Bush’s instructions—only the president-elect and anyone designated to take a top national security cabinet post could attend. “Neither of you are designated. So I can’t. I’m not going to violate the president’s direction.”

  “Okay, I got it,” Podesta said, barely concealing his irritation. Podesta had had all-source intelligence access before, as had Steinberg. He thought this was not helpful to Obama, who was largely unfamiliar with intelligence briefings.

  Obama arrived still in full campaign mode with ready smiles and firm handshakes all around. He was buoyant in the afterglow of victory.

  Two months earlier, after receiving a routine top secret briefing from McConnell on terrorism threats, Obama had half joked, “You know, I’ve been worried about losing this election. After talking to you guys, I’m worried about winning this election.”

  “Mr. President-elect, we need to see you for a second,” Podesta said, steering him off to a private room. When Obama returned, his demeanor was different. He was more reserved, even aggravated. The transition from campaigning to governing—with all its frustrations—was delivering another surprise. His people, the inner circle from the campaign and the brain trust of Democrats he had carefully assembled to guide his transition, were being excluded. The first customer–elect was going to have to go it alone.

  McConnell and Morell sat down with Obama in a private, secure room called a Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility, or SCIF. It was an unusually small room in the center of the building where a bathroom might normally be located. Designed to prevent eavesdropping, the SCIF was windowless and confining, even claustrophobic.

  At first, this would be something of a continuation and amplification of the earlier briefing McConnell had given candidate Obama. There were 161,000 American troops at war in Iraq and 38,000 in Afghanistan. Intelligence was making significant contributions to the war efforts. But the immediate threat to the United States came not from these war zones, but from Pakistan, an unstable country with a population of about 170 million, a 1,500-mile border with southern Afghanistan, and an arsenal of some 100 nuclear weapons.

  Priority one for the DNI, and now Obama, had to be the ungoverned tribal regions along the Pakistan-Afghanistan
border where Osama bin Laden, his al Qaeda network, and branches of the extremist insurgent Taliban had nested in 150 training camps and other facilities.

  Combined, the seven regions forming Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) were about the size of New Jersey. The extremist groups and tribal chiefs ruled much of the FATA and had footholds in Pakistan’s Northwest Frontier province.

  In September 2006, Pakistan had signed a treaty ceding full control of the FATA’s North Waziristan region to Taliban-linked tribal chiefs, creating a kind of Wild West for al Qaeda and the Taliban insurgents attacking the U.S. forces in Afghanistan.

  In the earlier briefing, McConnell had laid out the problem in dealing with Pakistan. It was a dishonest partner of the U.S. in the Afghanistan War. “They’re living a lie,” McConnell had said. In exchange for reimbursements of about $2 billion a year from the U.S., Pakistan’s powerful military and its spy agency, Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), helped the U.S. while giving clandestine aid, weapons and money to the Afghan Taliban. They had an “office of hedging your bets,” McConnell said.

  Dealing with the ISI would break your heart if you did it long enough, McConnell had explained. It was as if there were six or seven different personalities within the ISI. The CIA exploited and bought some, but at least one section—known as Directorate S—financed and nurtured the Taliban and other terrorist groups. CIA payments might put parts of the ISI in America’s pocket, McConnell had said, but the Pakistani spy agency could not or would not control its own people.

  The Pakistani leadership believed the U.S. would eventually withdraw from the region, as it had toward the end of the Cold War once the occupying Soviet forces retreated from Afghanistan in 1989. Their paranoid mind-set was, in part, understandable. If America moved out again, India and Iran would fill the power vacuum inside Afghanistan. And most of all, Pakistan feared India, an avowed enemy for more than 60 years. As a growing economic and military powerhouse, India had numerous intelligence programs inside Afghanistan to spread its influence there. Pakistan worried more about being encircled by India than being undermined by extremists inside its borders.